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I consider a two-step decision-making problem. 
In the first stage, the individual chooses one 
opportunity set among some opportunity sets 
and in the second stage, he/she chooses one 
alternative from the opportunity set.  One simple 
example is to reser ve a restaurant.  Suppose 
the difference of some restaurants is only in the 
menu of meals that they serve.  The individual 
chooses a menu ?this means he/she selects a 
restaurant? in the first stage and chooses a meal 
in the second stage.  He/she can choose a meal 
freely in the second stage.  Menus of restaurants 
correspond to the opportunity sets.  He/she has 
a preference not only over meals but also over 
menus.
 It seems that there are two main approaches 
for the preference over opportunity sets.  One is 
instrumental-value approach.  Kreps ?????? and 
Nehring and Puppe ?????? are classified into 
this approach.  We often do not know what we 
would want to eat until we would sit on the seat 
of the restaurant while we know the menu of the 
restaurant.  In such case, we desire flexibility of 
choice at the second stage.  Kreps ?????? shows 
that the preference over opportunity sets that 
satisfies some axioms can be represented by the 
weighted combination of state-dependent utility 
functions that can be interpreted as the expected 
utility from opportunity sets. In this case, the 
reason why people ?weakly? prefer bigger 
opportunity sets than smaller one is that it may 
give more utility.  The other approach is intrinsic-
value approach.  This paper is classified into this 
approach.  We often think it is valuable to choose 
by ourselves, and that the decision-making is 
important.  It is natural to think many options 
are much better than only one choice even if 
they choose the same option as a result.  This 
approach focuses on the preference of individuals 
who consider the freedom of choice intrinsically 
important.
 Within intrinsic-value approach, there are 
two approaches.  One is non-preference-based 
approach and the other is preference-based 
approach.  In non-preference-based approach, 
the size or cardinality of the opportunity sets 
is the most important information to evaluate 
opportunity sets.  Sudgen ??????, Pattanaik and 
Xu ?????, ????? and Xu ?????? are classified 
into this approach.  Pattanaik and Xu ?????? 
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 The main purpose of this paper is to explore representing functions for the preference over opportunity sets in 
terms of intrinsic value of freedom of choice.  Given sets of axioms that implicitly define the preference over opportunity 
sets, the representation ?explains? the preference over opportunity sets as being as if the individual were maximizing 
the weighted cardinality of elements in an opportunity set where the singleton sets of these elements offer the highest 
degree of intrinsic value of freedom of choice in the opportunity set ?Theorem ??, or the representation ?explains? the 
preference over opportunity sets as being as if the individual were maximizing the weighted cardinality of all elements in 
an opportunity set ?Theorem ??.
?????????  Intrinsic value of freedom of choice, Opportunity set, Cardinality representation.
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assumes that every singleton set is indifferent 
in terms of intrinsic value of freedom of choice 
and shows that the preference over opportunity 
sets is characterized by the simple cardinality 
rule in which opportunity sets are ordered only 
by the number of the elements of opportunity 
sets.  Sen ?????? insisted that the preference over 
alternatives must be incorporated to evaluate 
the opportunity sets in terms of intrinsic value 
of freedom of choice.  In the preference-based 
approach, on the other hand, they consider 
that even the preference over alternatives have 
the information to evaluate the oppor tunity 
sets in terms of intrinsic value of freedom of 
choice. A lot of writers consider the axioms and 
characterize the preference over opportunity 
sets depending on preferences over alternatives 
?Pattanaik and Xu ??????, Puppe ?????, ?????, 
Sen ??????, Romero-Medina ??????, and Tatsumi 
???????.  Incorporating the preferences over 
alternatives to evaluate the freedom of choice 
of opportunity sets, these papers, in common, 
discard the assumption that every singleton set is 
indifferent.  As a result, even singleton sets may 
come to be ordered in terms of intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice.  The stand point of this paper 
is at between non-preference-based approach 
and preference-based approach. I will  not 
depict the formal link between preferences over 
alternatives and the preference over opportunity 
sets. I will just implicitly define the preferences 
over opportunity sets by axioms that represent 
the preference for intrinsic value of freedom 
of choice, and allow, if the axiom would not be 
violated, the non-indifference between singleton 
set and the strict ordering over singleton sets 
in terms of intrinsic value of freedom of choice. 
This implies that I assume each singleton sets 
offers various degree of intrinsic value of freedom 
of choice.
 The main purpose of this paper is to explore 
the representing functions for the preference 
over opportunity sets in terms of intrinsic value 
of freedom of choice.  This provides a connection 
between the preference over opportunity sets 
in terms of intrinsic value of freedom of choice 
and traditional real valued representation 
theorem.  Especially, the representation of this 
paper shows that preference over opportunity 
sets is ? explained? by two types of cardinality 
representations.  Kreps ?????? showed the 
existence of a representing function for the 
preference over opportunity sets although it is 
classified into instrumental-value approach.  The 
aim of Kreps ?????? to explore the representing 
function for the preference over opportunity sets 
resembles those of ours.  We can find this point in 
Kreps ?????? as follows.
  The approach taken in this  paper is 
exclusively descriptive.  Preferences 
over opportunity sets are taken as given, 
and the representation ?explains? these 
preferences as being as if the individual 
were maximizing a state dependent utility 
function of subsequent consumption.
Kreps ?????? connected the simple axioms 
with much richer description of the individuals? 
behavior as a representation function.  This 
paper also aims to describe the individuals? 
behavior, in which the individuals desire the 
intrinsic value of freedom of choice, with richer 
description by representing functions.  In this 
paper, given sets of axioms which implicitly 
define the preference over opportunity sets, the 
representation ?explains? the preference over 
opportunity sets as being as if the individual were 
maximizing the weighted cardinality of elements 
in an opportunity set where the singleton sets of 
these elements offer the highest degree of intrinsic 
value of freedom of choice in the opportunity set 
?Theorem ??, or the representation ?explains? 
the preference over opportunity sets as being as 
if the individual were maximizing the weighted 
cardinality of all elements in an opportunity set 
?Theorem ??.  The framework of this paper will 
not contradict to the axioms of Kreps ?????? but 
I assume additional axioms because I want to 
characterize the preference in terms of intrinsic 
value of freedom of choice.  The form of our 
representing function is totally different from that 
of Kreps ??????.  I will introduce two contrasting 
axioms for intrinsic value of freedom of choice 
and explore the existence of representing 
functions that represent the preference with each 
of them.  Given universal set of alternatives X and 
its power set %?X???X, the two axioms are as 
follows.
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Axiom F-1:   Given A!%?X?, ?x?i?a? for all a!  
A?,?A,?x?(A.
Axiom F-2:   For all A, B, C and D!%?X? such 
that A+C?B+D?z
?A+B and C(D? ( A,C(B,D.
 The axioms F-1 and F-2 characterize what 
is meaningful addition to an opportunity set.  On 
F-1, the addition of the singleton set ?x? to a set 
A is meaningful, pushes up the intrinsic value 
of freedom choice of A, if and only if ?x? offers 
at least as much freedom as any singleton set 
which is a subset of A.  Obviously, this axiom is 
weaker than that of Pattanaik and Xu ?????? in 
which every singleton is meaningful.  However, 
this axiom depicts the preference for intrinsic-
value of freedom of choice because the addition 
of ?x? to B might be meaningful even if ?x? is not 
strictly better than all singleton subset of B.  If 
I characterize the preference over opportunity 
sets in instrumental-value approach framework 
and preference over opportunity sets is related 
to the preference over alternatives, this axiom 
must be wrong because the addition of ?x? will 
not induce higher indirect utility.  Axiom F-2 
implies that any addition of an opportunity set is 
meaningful because I assume ?x?(z for all x!X 
and A+A.  Then, F-2 characterize the preference 
for freedom of choice in ?Pattanaik and Xu ?????? 
type?.  But in F-2, I postulate that the relation 
between C and D must hold after the addition to 
indifferent opportunity sets A and B.
 The outline of this paper is as follows. 
In section ? ,  I  will  introduce notations of 
this paper and basic axioms which implicitly 
define the preference for freedom of choice. 
Section ? provides the definitions of cardinality 
representations and representation theorems of 
those functions. Section ? contains concluding 
remarks.  The mathematical appendix for the 
proofs will be in section ?. 
??????????????????????
Let X be the finite set of alternatives containing at 
least one element, and let %?X???X denote the set 
of all subsets of X.  Generic elements of %?X? will 
be denoted by A, B, C, ....  Let i  be a complete 
and transitive binary relation on %?X?.  ?AiB? 
will be interpreted as ?A offers at least as much 
freedom as B?.  The symmetric and asymmetric 
part of i  are defined as usual, i.e. A+B: + ?AiB 
and BiA?, and A(B + ?AiB and not BiA?. 
Both (  and +  are transitive by the transitivity 
of i .  Throughout the paper, we assume A(z 
for all A!%?X?[z.  Next, I will introduce some 
axioms which implicitly define i .
M ?Monotonicity?: For all A, B!%?X? such that 
A4B, AiB.
 Monotonicity axiom is a standard axiom in 
this field. This axiom states that the opportunity 
set offers at least as much freedom as any subsets 
of this opportunity set.  I do not assume any cost 
and disutility to choose an alternative from an 
opportunity set.
IND ?Independence?}:  For all A, B!%?X? and 
x,y!X[?A,B?,
??x?+?y? and A+B? ( A,?x?+B,?y?.
 Axiom IND states that if singleton sets ?x? 
and ?y? are indifferent, the simultaneous addition 
to dif ferent sets A and B does not ef fect the 
ordering between A and B.  IND takes over the 
spirit from independence axiom ? in Pattanaik and 
Xu ??????, in which the simultaneous addition of 
a singleton does not effect the preference over 
opportunity sets.  This axiom played a central 
role to induce cardinality property of i .
 As I mentioned in the introduction, I 
discard the assumption that all singleton sets are 
indifferent in terms of intrinsic value of freedom 
of choice, and I consider even singleton sets offer 
several degree of intrinsic value of freedom of 
choice.  This is from the observation that I feel 
ridiculous that three singletons such that ?enjoy 
one?s life?, live life as a slave? and ?hang oneself? 
offer the same or two degree of intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice.  Pattanaik and Xu ?????? and 
Puppe ?????? similarly allow that strict order of 
singleton set in terms of intrinsic value of freedom 
of choice where they related the preference 
over opportunity sets to the preferences over 
alternatives.  In this case, we have a problem that 
how much must it be a good singleton to push up 
the degree of intrinsic value of freedom of choice 
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of the opportunity set when the singleton set is 
added to an opportunity set.  The following two 
axioms depict the property of this aspect.
F-1 ?Freedom ??: For all x!%?X? and A!%?X? 
such that x"A,
?x?i?a??6a!A?,? x?,A(A.
 Axiom F-1 states that the addition of ?x? 
to A pushes up the degree of intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice of A if and only if ?x? offers at 
least as much freedom as any singleton set ?a? 
which is a subset of A.  F-1 restricts the lowest 
level of ?x? to push up the degree of freedom 
of choice as that ?x? offers indifferent freedom 
to any other singleton sets in A.  Note that if I 
characterize the preference over opportunity sets 
in instrumental-value approach which is related 
to the preference over alternatives, this axiom 
might be wrong because indifferent singleton set 
would not derive bigger indirect utility from the 
opportunity sets.  Contrasting to F-1, axiom F-2 
is given as follows.
F-2 ?Freedom ??}:  For all A, B, C and D!%?X? 
such that A+C?B+D?z,
?A+B and C(D? ( A,C(B,D.
 Note that, given F-2, for all A!%?X? and 
x"A, we have A,?x?(A because I assume ?x?
(z and A+A.  Then, any addition of an element 
to a set is meaningful in terms of intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice.  This means F-2 characterizes 
the preference for freedom of choice in ?Pattanaik 
and Xu ?????? type?.  But in F-2, I postulate that 
the strict relation between C and D must hold 
after the addition to indifferent opportunity sets 
A and B.  Axiom F-1 and F-2 are independent 
although F-2 implies the sufficiency part ?&? of 
F-1.  Next, I will introduce axiom SD which is 
assumed throughout the paper.
SD ?Singleton Dominance?}:  For all a!X and 
B!%?X?,
??a?(?b? for all b!B? ( ?a?(B.
 Axiom SD restricts the preference over 
opportunity sets so that inferior singletons never 
dominate the superior one even if so many 
inferior ones would gather up.  It seems that SD 
must hold both in the intrinsic-value approach 
and in the instrumental-value approach. 
????????????????????????????????????????
I will show the implication of M, IND, F-1 and 
SD by showing the representing results that 
?explain? the preference over opportunity sets. 
First, I define a representing function and a 
restriction of the function.  The first representing 
function, S-cardinality ?Single state cardinality?, is 
defined as follows.
Definition 1.  A preference over opportunity 
sets i  is said to be represented by S-cardinality 
if there exists a subset S3%?X? which is ordered 
by 3  and a strictly decreasing function m: S?
R?? such that
u?A?:?m?sA??sA+A?
represents i  where
sA? (
s+A?z, s!S
s.
 For given A !%?X?,  the representing 
function u??? takes the cardinality of a subset of A, 
? sA+A? , as the component of the representing 
value.  Then, this representation may separate 
the elements of A into ?counted? elements as the 
representing value of A that are in sA+A and ?not 
counted? elements that are in A[?sA+A?.  Hence, 
this representing function can represent the 
preference over opportunity sets in which not all 
elements in an opportunity set is meaningful for 
the intrinsic value of freedom of choice.  However, 
note that the simple cardinality rule, where all 
elements are counted as the representing value, 
is still a special case of S-cardinality, i.e., if S??X? 
and m{?X?}??, then for all A, B!%?X?,
u?A?$u?B? , ?A$?B.
In the simple cardinality rule, A?sA for all 
A!%?X?.  As I will mention later, S can be 
interpreted as the set of the candidates to be 
counted as the representing value.  S-cardinality 
uses only one set of candidates sA when it 
evaluates A.  This is why I call this representation 
Single state cardinality.  The m weights the 
cardinality of elements depending which s!  S 
has non-empty intersection with the elements. 
I will depict the preference which satisfies M, 
IND, F-1 and SD over opportunity sets by this 
representation function.  We need to get the class 
99
???????????????????????????????????????
of functions narrowed by the following restriction.
Definition 2.  The function u: %?X?? R satisfies 
Additive consistency property if
6x!X,?u? x?? !
u? x??u? y?
u? y?.
 Here, we have the following representation 
theorem.
Theorem 1.  A complete and transitive binary 
relation i  on %?X? satisfies M, IND, F and SD 
if and only if i  is represented by S-cardinality 
where the representing function satisfies Additive 
consistency property.
 T h e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  ?e x p l a i n s? t h e 
preference over opportunity sets which satisfies 
M, IND, F-1 and SD as being as if the individual 
were maximizing the weighted cardinality of 
the ?best? elements to be counted as the value 
of the oppor tunity set.  The set sA+A in the 
representing function can be interpreted as the 
set of the ?best? elements to be counted as the 
representing value of the opportunity set and 
m?sA??sA+A? can be interpreted as the weighted 
cardinality of those elements.  The reason why 
I interpret the elements in sA+A as the ?best? 
elements is that the preference can be explained 
by the representing function with the set S which 
is ordered by the set inclusive relation.  When we 
judge the value of a set by a kind of cardinality, 
we need to decide which elements should be 
counted.  The elements of S can be interpreted as 
the sets of candidates that might be counted.  The 
elements of the intersection of A and a certain 
s!S, i.e. the elements of s+A, will be counted 
as the value of A.  Because S is ordered by the 
set inclusive relation, for given sl, sm!S such that 
sl3 sm, all elements in sl+A must be counted if sm 
is adopted as the set of elements that is counted. 
Then, the smaller a set s is, the ?better? set of 
candidates it would be.  Since sA is the smallest 
set of candidates that have non-empty intersection 
with A, I can interpret sA+A as the set of elements 
that are the ?best? elements to be counted in 
A.  In the representing function, the cardinality 
of opportunity sets is weighted by m depending 
on how ?good? the candidates to be counted 
is.  In my context, ?the ?best? elements to be 
counted? can be interpreted as ?the elements 
that offer the highest degree of intrinsic value of 
freedom of choice?.  Thus, I also can say that the 
representation ?explains? the preference over 
opportunity sets as being as if the individual were 
maximizing the weighted cardinality of elements 
in an opportunity set where the singleton sets of 
these elements offer the highest degree of intrinsic 
value of freedom of choice in opportunity set. The 
proof of Theorem ? is as follows.
 Proof.  STEP ?: PROOF OF IF-PART:
 STEP ?-?: For all A, B!%?X? such that B3A, 
sA3 sB.
Pick any A, B!%?X? such that B3A.  By the 
assumption of if-part, I have either sA3 sB or sB3 sA. 
I will show sA3 sB by a contradiction. Suppose 
sBQ sA on a contrary.  Pick any b!  sB such that 
b!B.  Since B3A, b!A.  This contradicts to the 
definition that sA is the minimal set in S which 
includes the elements of A.  Then, sA3 sB.
 STEP ?-?: For all  A!%?X? and  a!A, u?A?
$u? a? and !a!Au? a?$u?A?.
The first claim is shown as follows.  Pick arbitrary 
A!%?X? and a!A.  We have two cases, a! sA and 
a" sA.  If a! sA, sA?s?a?.  Then, we have 
u?A??m?sA??sA+A?$m?sA??sA+?a?
 ?m?s?a?? s?a?+?a??u? a?.
If a" sA, I have sAQ s?a?.  This implies m?sA??m?s?a?. 
So, for al! sA, the following relation holds.
u?A??m?sA??sA+A?$m?sA??sA+?al?
 ?m?s?a?? s?a?+?a??u? a?.
Here, I have u?A?$u??a? for all A!%?X? and 
a!A.
 The second claim is shown as follows.  I 
have two cases, ? sA+A???A and ? sA+A??
?A. If ? sA+A???A, sA?s?a? for all a!A.  Then, I 
have
?!
a!A
u? a??!
a!A
m?s?a?? s?a?+?a?
??!
a!A
m?sA??sA+?a??m?sA??A+ sA??u?A?.
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Otherwise, if ? sA+A???A, then there exists 
AlQA such that Al?sA+A.  Hence, the following 
relation holds.
?!
a!A
u? a??!
a!Al
u? a??!
a!A[Al
u? a?
??u?A??!
a!A[Al
u? a??u?A?.
 STEP ?-?: i  satisfies M.
Assume B3A. I know sA3 sB by Step ?-?.  I have 
two cases, sA?sB and sAQ sB.  In the first case, I 
denote sA?sB?sl.  Because B3A, the following 
relation hold,
u?A??m?sl??sl+A?$m?sl??sl+B??u?B?
Then, u?A?$u?B? and AiB.  In the second case, 
pick any al! sA. Then, u? al??m?sA?.  Since sAQ sB, 
m?sA??m?sB?.  Because m?sB?$u? b? for all b!B, 
u? al??u? b? for all b!B.  Hence, by Additive 
consistency property, I have 
u?A?$u?al?? !
u?al??u?x?
u?x?$!
b!B
u?B?$u?B?.
Thus, I have A(B.  Here, M holds.
 STEP ?-?: i  satisfies IND.
Assume for some A, B!%?X? and x, y!X[?A,B?, 
?x?+?y? and A+B.  I first show that s?x? s?y?, sA?
sB and sA,?x??sB,?y?.  ?x?+?y? implies m?s?x??
u? x??u? y??m?s?y?.  Then, m?s?x??m?s?y? and 
s?x? s?y?.  For the proof of sA?sB, suppose sAQ sB. 
Pick any al! sA such that al!A. Then, u? al??
m?s?al??m?sA?.  Next, pick any b!B.  Then m?sB?
$u??b?.  Since sAQ sB, I have m?sA??m?sB? and 
u? al??u? b? for all b!B.  Hence, I have 
?u?A?$u? al??? !
u? al??u? x?
u?x?
? $!
b!B
u? b?$u?B?.
T h e n ,  u?A??u?B? a n d  A (B .   T h i s  i s  a 
contradiction.  Hence sA?sB.  For the proof of sA,?x?
?sB,?y?, suppose sA,?x?Q sB,?y?.  Then, there exists 
al!?A,?a? such that al! sA,?x? and sA,?x?+?B,  
?y??z.  Because sA,?x?Q sB,?y?, u??al??u??b? 
for all b!B,? y?.  I have two cases, al?x and 
al!  A.  If al?x, I have u? x??u? y?.  This is a 
contradiction.  If al!A, I have 
u?A?$  u?al?? !
u?al??u?z?
u?z?$!
b!B
u? b?$u?B?.
This is a contradiction.  Then sA,?x? sB,?y?.  Now, 
I have s?x? s?y?, sA?sB, and sA,?x? sB,?y?.  By the 
definition of u???
u?A,?x??m?sA,?x? ? sA,?x?+?x? ? m?sA,?x?
 ?? sA,?x?+A? and
u?B,?x??m?sB,?y? ? sB,?y?+?y? ? m?sB,?y?
 ?? sB,?y?+B?.
First, I will show m?sA,?x? ? sA,?x?+?x??m?sB,?y?
? sB,?y?+?y?.  I have either x! sA,?x? or x" sA,?x?. 
If x! sA,?x?, sA,?x? s?x?.  Then, y! s?y? s?x? sA,?x?
?sB,?y? and y! sB,?y?.  So, m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?+?x?
?m?sB,?y?? sB,?y?+?y?.  Otherwise, if x" sA,?x?, 
y"  sB,?y? because y! sB,?y? implies sB,?y? s?y? and 
x! s?x? s?y??sB,?y? sA,?x?.  Then, m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?
+?x????m?sB ,?y?? sB ,?y?+?y?.  Next, I will 
show m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?+A??m?sB,?y?? sB,?y?+B?.  I 
have either A+ sA,?x? z or A+ sA,?x? z.  Assume 
A+ sA,?x? z first.  Because A,?x?4A, sA,?x?3 sA 
by Step ?-?. Since sA is the minimal set which 
includes the elements of A and A+ sA,?x? z, I 
have sA,?x? sA.  Then m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?+A??m?sA?
? sA+A??u?A??u?B??m?sB??sB+B??m?sB,?y?
? sB,?y?+B?.  On the other hand, assume A+ sA,?x?
?z.  I have sB,?y?+B?z because sB,?y?+B?z 
implies sB,?y? sB?sA, sB,?y?+A?z and sA,?x?+A? 
z.  Then, m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?+A????m?sB,?y?? sB,?y?
+B?.  Here, I have m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?+?x??m?sB,?y?
? sB,?y?+?y? and m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?+A??m?sB,?y?? s 
B,?y?+B?.  Hence, u?A,?x??u?B,?y?, A,?x?
+B,?y? and IND holds.
 STEP ?-?:  i  satisfies F.
 STEP ?-?-?:  6x!X, A!%?X? s.t.  x"A,???x?
i?a??6a!A ( ?x?,A(A.?
Assume for some A!%?X? and x"A, ?x?i?a? 
for all a!A.  I have two cases.  In the first case, 
?x?(?a? for all a!A.  In the second case, there 
exists a!A such that ?x?+?a?.  In the first case, 
u??x??u??a? for all a!A.  Then, by Additive 
consistency property,
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u? A,?x?$u? x?? !
u?x??u?b?
u?b?$!
a!A
u?A?$u?A?.
Hence, A,?x?(A.  In the second case, I first 
show sA,?x? sA by a contradiction.  Since A3A,
?x?, sA,?x?3 sA.  Then, suppose sA,?x?Q sA.  Then, 
x ! sA ,? x? s? x?.   This implies u?? x??m?s? x??
m?sA?$u??a? for all a!A.  This contradicts to 
the assumption of this case.  Then sA,?x? sA. 
Furthermore, x! sA,?x? must hold since x" sA,?x? 
implies the existence of al!A such that al! sA,?x?
?s?al? and u? al??u? x?.  Here, I have
u?A,?x??m?sA,?x?? sA,?x?+?A,?x?
 ? m?sA ,? x?? sA ,? x?+A??m?sA ,? x?? sA ,? x?
+?x?
 ?m?sA??sA+A??m?sA,?x?
 ?u?A??m?sA,?x?
 ?u?A?.
Hence, I have u?A,?x??u?A? and A,?x?(A.
 STEP ?-?-?: 6x!X, A!%?X? s.t.  x"A,???x?
i?a??6a!A % ?x?,A(A.?
Assume for some x!%?X?, A!%?X? s.t. x"A, A,
?x?(A.  Then u?A,?x??u?A?.  I show x! sA,?x?. 
Because x" sA,?x? implies the existence of al!A 
such that al! sA,?x? sA, I have u?A??u?A,?x? 
and A+A,?x?.  This is a contradiction.  x! sA,?x? 
implies s?x? sA,?x? and u? x?$u? a? for all a!A. 
Hence, ?x?i?a? for all a!A.
 STEP ?-?: i  satisfies SD.
Obvious from Additive consistency property.
  STEP ?: PROOF OF ONLY IF-PART:
First, I define S3%?X? as follows;
S??s |s??b |?b?(?a?, a!X?,X[z.
On S, I have following Lemma.
Lemma 1.?(a) S is ordered by the set inclusive 
relation,
?(b) For all A!%?X? and al!X,
  al! sA ( ?al?i?a? for all a!A and ?al?(?a? 
for all a" sA,
?(c) For all A, B!%?X?,
 sAQ sB( 7a!A s.t. ?a?(?b? for all b!B,
?(d) For all A, B!%?X?,
 AiB ( sA3 sB, and
?(e) Given any sl!S, let sm!S be the smallest 
element such that sl?sm and sl3 sm.
 Then, for any a, b! sm[sl, ?a?+?b?.
 The proof of the Lemma ? is in the appendix. 
By Lemma ? a?, S is ordered by the set inclusive 
relation.  For convenience, I denote S??s?, s?, ..., 
sn? where si1 s j if i?j and sn?X.  Next, define a 
mapping m: S ? R?? as follows;
m?si??%i$ j ??s j .
 STEP ?-?: For all a,b!X, ?a?(?b? , u? a?
?u? b?
Assume ?a?(?b?. Then, there exists sl!S such 
that a! sl and b" sl.  Because S is ordered by the 
set inclusive relation, s?a?Q s?b?.  Since m is strictly 
decreasing function, I have u? a??u? b?.  Next, 
assume u? a??u? b? for some a, b!X.  Then I 
must have m?s?a??m?s?b? and s?a?Q s?b?.  Since a! s?a? 
and b" s?a?, there exists c!X such that ?a?(?c?i
?b?.  Hence ?a?(?b?.
 STEP ?-?: u??? satisfies Additive consistency 
property.
I first show that, given any al!X, s?b |u? al??u? b?, b!X?
?sk implies s?al? s
k??.  For convenience, I denote 
?b |u? al??u? b?, b!X??K throughout this step. 
Since u??al??u??b? for all b!K, ?al?(?b? for 
all b!K.  So, there exists sl!S such that al! sl 
and b" sl for all b!K.  Then, s?al?Q sk. I will show 
that sk???s?al?.  Suppose there exists smQ sk?? such 
that al! sm.  Then, there exists cl! sk??[sm.  Since 
cl" sm and al! sm, for some cm!X, I have ?al?(?cm?
i?cl?.  Then ?al?(?cl?.  So, I must have cl!K. 
This contradicts to the assumption that sk is the 
minimal subset which includes the elements of K. 
Hence, sk???s?al?.  Since al! s
i for all i$k?? and 
al"K, the following inequality holds.
?u? al??m?sk???
 ? ??s?? ?s???????sk??
 ? ??s?? ?s???????sk??? s
k????
 ?? ??s???s???????sk?? ?? s
k??????
 ?? ??s???s???????sk?? ?? s
k??????
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 ????
 ?? ??s???s???????sn?? ?? s
n??????
 ?? ??s???s???????sn??? s
n????
 ? ??s???s???????sn
 ?m?sk???? sk????
 ??m?sk?????? sk??????
 ??m?sk?????? sk??????
 ????
 ??m?sn?????? sn??????
 ?? m?sn???? sn????
 $m?sk?? ? b |s?b? s
k, b!K?
 ??m?sk????? b |s?b? s
k??, b!K?
 ??m?sk????? b |s?b? s
k??, b!K?
 ????
 ??m?sn???? ? b |s?b? s
n??, b!K?
 ??m?sn??? b |s?b? s
n, b!K?
 ?!
b!K
u? b?? !
u? al??u? b?
u? b?.
Hence, Additive consistency property holds.
 STEP ?-?: For all A, B!%?X?, AiB , u?A?
$u?B?.
 STEP ?-?-?: For all A, B!%?X?, AiB ( u?A?
$u?B?.
Assume AiB.  By Lemma ? d?, sA3 sB.  holds. 
Now, I have two cases, sAQ sB and sA?sB.  First, 
assume sAQ sB. Then, by Lemma ? d?, there exists 
al!A and such that ?a?(?b? for all b!B.  By 
Step ?-?, I have u? al??u? b? for all b!B.  Since 
Additive consistency property holds by Step ?-?, I 
have
u?A?$u? al?? !
u? al??u? b?
u? b?$!
b!B
u? b?$u?B?.
Here, I have u?A??u?B? if sAQ sB.  Next, assume 
sA?sB holds.  I first show that ? A+ sA?$? B 
+ sA? by a contradiction.  Suppose ? A+ sA??? B 
+ sB?.  I know that for all x, y! sA?sB, ?x?+?y?. 
Then, by IND there exists BlQB, sB such that 
Bl+ sB+A+ sA.  Then, by F, B+ sB(A+ sA.  Then 
B(A.  This is a contradiction.  Then, I have ? A 
+ sA?$? B+ sB?.  This implies u?A?$u?B?.
 STEP ?-?-?: For all A, B!%?X?, AiB % u?A?
$u?B?.
Assume u?A?$u?B? for some A, B!%?X?.  I first 
show sA3 sB by a contradiction. Suppose there 
exists al! sA such that al" sB.  Note that ?al?i?a? 
for all a!A by Lemma ? b?.  Since al" sB, there 
exists bl!B such that ?bl?(?al?.  Then u??bl?
?u??a? for all a!A.  Then, u?B?$u??bl??
!a!Au? a?$u?A?.  This is a contradiction.  Then 
sA3 sB.  Now I have two cases, sAQ sB and sA?sB.  If 
sAQ sB, there exists al!A such that ?al?(?b? for 
all b!B.  Then, Ai?al?(B by M and SD.  If sA
?sB.  u?A?$u?B? implies ? A+ sA?$? B+ sB?. 
Note that for all a!A+ sA and b!B+ sB, ?a?+
?b?.  Then, by IND and F, A+ sAiB+ sB.  Pick, if 
exists, any b?!B[sB.  Since there exists bl!B+ sB 
such that ?bl?(?b? , B+ sB+B+ sB,?b?  by F.  Next, 
if exists, any b?!B[sB, similarly, I have B+ sB,
?b? +B+ sB,?b? ,?b? .  Then B+ sB+B+ sB,?b?
,?b? . Repeating this process, B+ sB+B.  Then, 
AiA+ sAiB+ sB+B, and AiB.  ?
 N e x t  I  w i l l  d e p i c t  t h e  p r e f e r e n c e 
which satisfies M, IND, F-2 and SD by the 
other representing function.  I will define 
the M-cardinality ?Multi-states cardinality? 
representing function first.
Definition 3.  A preference over opportunity 
sets i  is said to be represented by M-cardinality 
if there exists a subset S3%?X? and a function m: 
X ? R?? such that
u?A?:?!
s!S
m?s? s+A represents i .
 The component of u?A? in M-cardinality 
includes all cardinalities of intersections of s!S 
and A and u?A? is the weighted combination 
of them.  As same as S-cardinality, the set S is 
also interpreted as the set of candidates to be 
counted as the representing value of A.  Then, 
M-cardinality takes all candidate elements in A as 
the elements to be counted as the representing 
value of A.  Similar with S-cardinality, simple 
cardinality rule is a special case of M-cardinality 
when S??X? and m?X???.  I have the second 
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representation theorem as follows.
Theorem 2.  A complete and transitive binary 
relation i  on %?X? satisfies M, IND, F-2 and SD 
if and only if i  is represented by M-Cardinality 
where the representing function satisfies Additive 
consistency condition.
 The elements of S can also be interpreted 
as the sets of candidates to be counted as the 
representing value of oppor tunity sets.  In 
M-cardinality representation, all candidates in the 
set will be counted.  Hence, the representation 
?explains? the preference over opportunity sets 
as being as if the individual were maximizing the 
weighted cardinality of all candidate elements 
which would be counted in the oppor tunity 
set.  Given a set A, M-cardinality considers all 
candidate elements in A as meaningful elements 
but the cardinalities are weighed depending 
on how it would be ranked as a candidate to 
be counted.  As we can find in the proof, this 
representation shows the individual were 
maximizing the weighted cardinality of all 
elements in the opportunity set.
 Proof.  STEP ?: PROOF OF IF-PART: i  satisfies M, 
IND, F-2 and SD.
M is obviously satisfied. I will show IND next. 
Assume for some A, B!%?X? and x, y!X[?A,B?, 
?x?+?y? and A+B.  Then, u? x??u? y? and u?A?
?u?B?.  By the definition of u???, u?A,?x??u?A?
?u??x??u?B??u??y??u?B,?y?.  Hence A,
?x?+B,?y?.  Similarly, F-2 holds.  For the proof 
of SD, assume, for some a!X and B!%?X?, ?a?
(?b? for all b!B.  Then, u?a??u?b? for all b!B. 
Additive consistency property implies u?a??
!b!Bu?b?.  Since !b!Bu?b??!b!B  !s!S m?s??s+
?b??!s!S !b!Bm?s??s+?b??!s!S m?s??s+B??
u?B?, I have ?a?(B.
  STEP ?: PROOF OF ONLY IF-PART:
First, I define S and m exactly the same as those 
of Step ? in the proof of Theorem ?.
 STEP ?-?: For all a, b!X, ?a?(?b? , u? a?
?u? b?.
Assume ?a?(?b? for arbitrar y a, b!X.  Then 
there exists sl!S such that a! sl and b" sl. 
Because S is ordered by the set inclusive relation, 
for any s!S, a! s whenever b! s.  Hence,
?u? a??!
s!S
m?s??s+?a?
 ? !
s!S, a! s
m?s?? !
s!S, b! s
m?s?
 ?!m?s??s+?b??u? b?.
Next, assume u??a??u??b? for some a, b!X. 
Then for some sl!S, a! sl and b" sl.  There 
must exists c!X such that ?a?(?c? and ?c?i?b?. 
Hence, I have ?a?(?b?.
 STEP ?-?: u??? satisfies Additive consistency 
property.
Using Step ?-?, I can prove, given any al!X, 
s?b |u? al??u? b?, b!X? s
k implies s?al? s
k?? exactly same 
as the step ?-? in the proof of Theorem ?.  For 
convenience, I denote K??b | u??al??u??b?, 
b!X?.  The following inequality holds.
?u? al?? ??s???s???????sk??
 ?? ??s???s???????sk????sk
 ?? ??s???s???????sk????sk??sk??
 ????
 ?? ??s???s???????sn??
 ?? ??s???s???????sn????sn
 ? ??s???s???????sk????sk??s
k
 ? ??s???s???????sk????sk??sk????s
k??
 ?? ??s???s???????sk????sk??sk????sk??
 ??sk??
 ????
 ?? ??s???s???????sn??s
n
 $ ??s???s???????sk????sk??K
+ sk?
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 ?? ??s???s???????sk????sk??sk???
 ??K+ sk???
 ?? ??s???s???????sk????sk??sk????sk??
 ??K+ sk???
 ????
 ?? ??s???s???????sn??K
+ sn?
 ???u?K?? !
u? x??u? y?
u? y?.
Hence, Additive consistency property holds.
 STEP ?-?: For all A, B!%?X?, AiB , u?A?
$u?B?.
 STEP ?-?-?: For all A, B!%?X?, AiB ( u?A?
$u?B?.
Assume AiB.  I first show that I must have only 
the following cases,
?????7k?s.t.?? A+ sk???B+ sk??
 and?? A+ si??? B+ si??6i?k or
?????? A+ si??? B+ si??6si!S.
I will show by a contradiction.  Suppose k such 
that ? A+ sk??? B+ sk? and ? A+ si??? B+ si? 
for all i?k exists.  Pick a pair a!A and b!B such 
that a, b! s? if this pair exists.  Pick any pairs from 
s? until I can not make any more pairs.  Any of 
the elements can only be chosen once.  If k??, I 
can not make any more pairs from s? even though 
there are elements of B left in s?.  If k??, I will 
restart making pairs from s?[s?.  Similarly, pick 
any pairs from s?[s? until I cannot make any more 
pairs.  If k??, I can not make any more pairs from 
s?[s? even though there are elements of B left 
in s?[s?.  If k??, I will restart making pairs from 
s?[s?.  By assumption, I can not make any more 
pairs from sk[sk?? even though there are elements 
of B left in sk[sk??.  By Lemma ? e?, for any pair a 
and b from the same set s j[s j??, I have ?a?+?b?. 
Let ?a?, ..., an?3A and ?b?, ..., bn?3B be the set of 
elements which are chosen as the pair.  By IND, I 
have ?a?, ..., an?+?b?, ..., bn?.  By assumption of the 
proof, there must exists bn??! s
k[sk?? such that 
bn??"?b?, ..., bn? and bn??!B.  By SD, I have ?bn??
(A[?a?, ..., an?.  Then, by F-2, I have ?b?, ..., bn?,
?bn?? (A and B(A.  This is a contradiction. Then, 
I must have the two cases written above.
 Next, I will show u?A??u?B? in the first 
case.  Let ? A+ sk??m and ? B+ sk??l  Then, by 
the definition of u???, 
 u?A??m?s???A+ s??
 ?m?s???A+ s??
 ???
 ?m?sk????A+ sk???
 ?m?sk?? l?m?sk???m? l?
 ?m?sk????A+ sk???
 ???
 ?m?sn?A+ sn,?and
 u?B??m?s???B+ s??
 ?m?s???B+ s??
 ???
 ?m?sk????B+ sk???
 ?m?sk?? l
 ?m?sk????B+ sk???
 ???
 ?m?sn?B+ sn
I only have to show that
?m?sk???m? l??m?sk???? A+ sk????????m?sn?
? A+ sn??m?sk????B+ sk????????m?sn??B+ sn?.
The proof is completed as follows.
?m?sk???m? l??m?sk???
 ? A+ sk????????m?sn??A+ sn?
??? ??s???s???????sk
???? ??s???s???????sk??
??????
???? ??s???s???????sn??
???? ??s???s???????sn
??? ??s???s???????sk??sk????s
k??
???? ??s???s???????sk????sk????s
k??
??????
???? ??s???s???????sn????sn??s
n
???m?sk????B+ sk????????m?sn??B+ sn?.
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Hence, I have u?A??u?B? in the first case.  In 
second case, I have obviously u?A??u?B? by the 
definition of u???.
 STEP ?-?-?: For all A, B!%?X?, AiB % u?A?
$u?B?.
Assume u?A?$u?B? for some A, B!%?X?.  By the 
definition of u???, I must have only two cases.
???? 7k?s.t?? A+ sk???B+ sk??and?? A+  
si??? B+ si??6i?k, 
?????A+ si??? B+ si??6si!S.
In the first case, I can prove A(B by the same 
process of Step ?-?-?.  In the second case, note 
that for all a!A and b!B such that sk[sk??, ?a?+
?b?.  Then, by IND, A+B.  ?
????????????
This study provided the two representation 
theorems for preferences over opportunity sets 
in terms of intrinsic value of freedom of choice. 
The aim to explore the representing functions is 
to describe the individuals? behavior with richer 
description by the representing function.  The 
source which makes the dif ference between 
the two representations is the difference in the 
axioms F-1 and F-2.  These axioms describe 
what kind of additions can push up the intrinsic 
value of freedom of choice.  F-1 postulates that 
the addition of a singleton set to an opportunity 
set pushes up the intrinsic value of freedom of 
choice if and only if the singleton set offers at 
least as much freedom as any singleton set which 
is a subset of the opportunity set.  F-1 derived 
the representation theorem which ?explains? 
the preference over opportunity sets as being as 
if the individual were maximizing the weighted 
cardinality of elements in an opportunity set 
where the singleton sets of these elements offer 
the highest degree of intrinsic value of freedom of 
choice in the opportunity set ?Theorem ??.  F-2 
postulates any addition to an opportunity set will 
push up the value.  F-2 derived the representation 
theorem which ?explains? the preference over 
opportunity sets as being as if the individual 
were maximizing the weighted cardinality of all 
elements in an opportunity set ?Theorem ??. 
??????????
I will prove Lemma ? in this section.
 Proof of Lemma 1:
??a?  Suppose there exist a,b!X and sl, sm!S 
such that a! sl, a" sm, b" sl and b! sl.  a! sl 
and b" sl imply, for some cl!X, ?a?(?cl?i
?b?.  a" sm and b! sm imply, for some cm!X, 
?b?(?cm?i?a?.  This is a contradiction.
??b?  Pick any A!%?X? and al! sA.  Suppose 
there exists am!A such that ?am?(?al? on 
the contrary.  Then for some s!S, am! s 
and al" s.  This is a contradiction because 
sA is the minimal set which includes the 
elements of A .   Then ?a l?i?a? for all 
a!A.  For the second statement, pick any 
am!X[sA.  Since al! sA, for some cl! sA, ?al?
(?cl?.  Otherwise, because am" sA, ?cl?i?am?. 
Hence ?al?(?am? for all am!X[sA.
??c?  Assume s A Q s B .   Then s A + B?z .   This 
implies that there exists al!A such that ?al?
(?b? for all b!B.
??d?  Suppose sBQ sA on the contrary.  By Lemma 
? c?,  for  some b l !B ,  ?b l?(? a? for  al l 
a!A.  By M and SD, B(?bl?(A.  This is a 
contradiction.
??e?  Pick any a, b! sm[sl.  Suppose ?a?(?b? on 
the contrary.  Then, there exists sn!S such 
that a! sn and b" sn. Since, by Lemma ? a?, 
S is ordered by the set inclusive relation, 
I have slQ snQ sm.  This contradict to the 
definition of sm.  ?
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